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FLORIDA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES: IS THE SOLUTION TO THE
FREE RIDER PROBLEM WORSE THAN THE PROBLEM
ITSELF?
CURTIS L. MACK* AND EZRA D. SINGER**
I. INTRODUCTION
The passage of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) in 1935
greatly facilitated union organization throughout the United
States.' The union movement was inhibited, however, in 1947 when
Congress amended the Act to allow states to enact "right-to-work"
statutes.' Such proposals were a source of great public debate in the
1950's.3 Although the issue is no longer of overriding national con-
cern, proposals continue to be made.'
The term "right-to-work" is misleading. "Right-to-work" laws do
not purport to guarantee a right to work or a right to a job. Rather,
these laws prohibit conditioning employment on membership in, or
payment of dues to, a labor organization.5 For this reason, labor
unions have traditionally opposed such laws.
Public employees, who are not covered by the NLRA, have tradi-
tionally fared poorly in the South. Mississippi, for example, has yet
to develop any legislative or policy guidelines for public-sector
collective bargaining; North Carolina prohibits public employee
collective bargaining.7 Many other southern states allow only lim-
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State University. Director, Region 10, National Labor Relations Board, Atlanta, Georgia;
former general counsel and chairman, Florida Public Employees Relations Commission, Tal-
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** J.D. 1978, Hofstra University; B.S. 1975, Cornell University. Attorney at Region 2,
National Labor Relations Board, New York, New York.
The authors wish to express their appreciation to Ruth L. Gokel, Florida State University
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1. National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 198, §§ 1-16, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current
version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1970)).
2. Act of June 23, 1947, Pub. L. No. 101, § 14(b), 61 Stat. 151 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §
164(b) (1970)). The provision reads: "Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as author-
izing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization
as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or application
is prohibited by State or Territorial law."
3. See P. SULTAN, RIGHT-To-WoRK LAws: A STUDY IN CONFLICT 56-57 (1958).
4. For a discussion of the situation in North Dakota, see Eissinger, The Right-to- Work
Imbroglio, 51 N.D.L. REv. 571 (1975).
5. Id. at 573. See also P. SULTAN, supra note 3.
6. "The term 'employer' ... shall not include the United States or . . . any State or
political subdivision thereof . National Labor Relations Act § 2(2), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2)
(1970).
7. See Summary of State Labor Laws, 51 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 501, 516 (Mar.
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ited bargaining rights to select groups of public employees.'
Florida is the exception in the South. Florida's Public Employees
Relations Act (PERA),5 enacted in 1974, governs nearly all the
state's public employees.' 0 PERA established a system of governing
labor relations quite similar to that of the NLRA," with the excep-
tion of the right to strike. 2
At present, there are approximately 470,000 public employees in
Florida, of whom about 250,000 are covered by a union contract. 3
Under the "right-to-work" provision in the Florida Constitution, no
employee may be required to join a union or to pay the equivalent
of dues paid by union members, even though these nonunion em-
ployees are given full use of the union's services." Thus, the non-
14, 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-97 to 100 (1975) (prohibiting public employees from joining
unions).
Tennessee had a strong prohibition, Weakley County Mun. Elec. Sys. v. Vick, 309 S.W.2d
792 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957), cert. denied, 309 S.W.2d 792 (Tenn. 1958) (held county had no
authority to enter into a collective bargaining agreement), but in February, 1978, enacted a
collective bargaining law. Tennessee Education Professional Negotiations Act, ch. 570, 1978
Tenn. Pub. Acts. The Act is limited to public school teachers and administrators. For a
discussion of this new law, see 753 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 12-15 (Apr. 3, 1978).
8. Summary of State Labor Laws, supra note 7.
9. Act of May 30, 1974, ch. 74-100, 1974 Fla. Laws 134 (current version at FLA. STAT. §§
447.201-.609 (1977)). For a survey of the scope and current status of the provisions of PERA,
see McHugh, The Florida Experience in Public Employee Collective Bargaining, 1974-1978:
Bellwether for the South, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 263 (1978).
10. Certain categories of employees are excluded under § 447.203(3) of PERA. See
McHugh, supra note 9, at 277, 288-96.
11. See McHugh, supra note 9, at 270.
12. FLA. STAT. § 447.505 (1977) provides that "[nio public employee or employee organi-
zation may participate in a strike against a public employer by instigating or supporting, in
any manner, a strike."
13. See FLA. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FLORIDA EMPLOYMENT STATISTIcs, BuLL. No. 357, at 17
(1978). As of April, 1978, approximately 216,000 public employees were eligible for member-
ship at the time of elections in units certified by the Florida Public Employees Relations
Commission. Inquiries should be directed to Supervisor of Elections, PERC, 2003 Apalachee
Parkway, Tallahassee, Florida. Based on author Mack's experience as former chairman of
PERC, 250,000 is probably a more accurate, but conservative, figure because membership
figures are not updated at PERC once a unit has been certified and because the 216,000 figure
does not reflect public employees covered by private union contracts in units not certified by
PERC.
14. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6 provides: "The right of persons to work shall not be denied or
abridged on account of membership or non-membership in any labor union or labor organiza-
tion."
The original 1885 constitution did not contain a right-to-work provision. Article I, § 12 of
the 1885 constitution was amended in 1944 by adding the following provision:
The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of member-
ship or non-membership in any labor union, or labor organization; provided, that
this clause shall not be construed to deny or abridge the right of employees by and
through a labor organization or labor union to bargain collectively with their em-
ployer.
The 1968 constitutional revision put the provision in a separate section and revised the
language. See generally D'Alemberte, Commentary, in 25A FLA. STAT. ANN. 102 (West 1970).
FLORIDA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
union employees may be viewed as "free riders." They have the
benefits of unionism without the costs.
To relieve the financial burden on unions required to represent
fully both dues-paying members and nonmembers who contribute
nothing for the services received, PERA was amended in 1977 to
stipulate that "certified employee organizations shall not be re-
quired to process grievances for employees who are not members of
the organization."' 5 This approach is unusual in that, although ex-
clusive union representation is maintained, the statute as amended
attempts to grant equitable relief to unions burdened with a high
percentage of nonmember employees who are reaping the benefits
of the union's services.
This is the first time a state legislature has adopted such an
approach to grapple with the problem of "free riders" in the public
sector. This amendment must be analyzed carefully to determine its
legality. A thorough analysis may also be useful to other state legis-
latures faced with this problem.'"
This article will first outline the relevant labor law concepts to
provide a framework for the discussion of the "free rider" problem.
After an analysis of the Florida statutory scheme, the authors will
propose a solution they feel will withstand judicial scrutiny and at
the same time meet the conflicting needs of public employers, pub-
lic employee unions, and individual employees.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Doctrine of Exclusivity
A union elected by a majority of the employees in a bargaining
unit serves as the exclusive bargaining representative for all employ-
ees in that unit. 7 In granting unions exclusive control over both
contract negotiation and administration, the legislature has con-
cluded that individual interests are necessarily subordinated to the
interests of the group.'" The United States Supreme Court, recogniz-
15. Act of June 24, 1977, ch. 77-343, § 14, 1977 Fla. Laws 1476 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
447.401 (1977)).
16. Ga. HB 1536 (to authorize collective bargaining by public employees) and Ga. HB
1537 (to authorize collective bargaining with policemen and firemen) were introduced in the
Georgia Legislature in January, 1978.
17. National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970) provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by
the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other conditions of employment .... [Emphasis added.]
18. JI. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 339 (1944). The Court held that "the majority
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ing the centricity of the doctrine of exclusivity in the law of labor
relations, stated that:
National labor policy has been built on the premise that by
pooling their economic strength and acting through a labor organi-
zation freely chosen by the majority, the employees of an appropri-
ate unit have the most effective means of bargaining for improve-
ments in wages, hours, and working conditions. The policy there-
fore extinguishes the individual employee's power to order his own
relations with his employer and creates a power vested in the cho-
sen representative to act in the interests of all employees."
Although criticized as incompatible with any "coherent conception
of civil liberty,"' * the system of exclusive union representation is
essential to promote the congressional goal of "industrial peace and
the improvement of wages and working conditions by fostering a
system of employee organization and collective bargaining."'2'
Both the employers and the unions benefit by exclusive union
status. This is readily apparent in contract negotiations. Multiple
unions representing different employees in the same bargaining unit
will of necessity result in numerous agreements to be enforced. Each
agreement conceivably might contain significantly different provi-
sions applicable to different members of the same group. The Su-
preme Court has recognized that interunion rivalries may create
"dissension within the work force and eliminat[e] the advantages
to the employee of collectivization. 2 12 By channeling employee
grievances through an agreed-to dispute resolution machinery, the
employer and the union will be spared the "[c]haos [which]
would result if every disenchanted employee, every disturbed em-
ployee, and every employee who harbored a dislike for his employer,
could harass both the union and the employer by processing griev-
ances through the various steps of the grievance procedure and ulti-
mately by bringing an action to compel arbitration .... 2
rules, and if it collectivizes the employment bargain, individual advantages or favors will
generally in practice go in as a contribution to the collective result."
19. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967) (emphasis added); see
Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal
System, 67 YALE L.J. 1327, 1333 (1958). See also Frank, The Rights of the Exclusive Bargain-
ing Representative Versus the Rights of the Individual: A Union Perspective, 6 J.L. & EDUC.
367, 370 (1977).
20. Petro, Civil Liberty, Syndicalism, and the NLRA, 5 U. TOL. L. REv. 447, 447-48
(1974).
21. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967); see J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
22. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 221 (1977).
23. Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F.2d 179, 186 (2d Cir.
1962).
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Exclusive control over the grievance procedure is necessary to
achieve industrial peace. 2' From management's perspective,
''vesting exclusive control over grievances in the [majority] union
simplifies contract administration. '2 5 Grievances are processed in
an orderly manner, following a procedure negotiated by the em-
ployer and the union. The employer works with recognized or certi-
fied bargaining agents with a vested interest in protecting the integ-
rity of the collective bargaining agreement. By working with the
exclusive bargaining representative, the employer in many in-
stances is spared the time, effort, and money of processing spurious
grievances because the union has eliminated or dismissed all griev-
ances which do not raise a colorable violation of the contract." Most
important for the employer, exclusive control over the grievance
procedure by a majority union precludes a situation in which mem-
bers of rival (minority) unions "press aggressively all manner of
grievances, regardless of their merit, in an effort to squeeze the last
drop of competitive advantage out of each grievance and to use the
settlement even of the most trivial grievances as a vehicle to build
up their own prestige. 2 7
Aggressive and irresponsible action by a minority union will, in
all probability, bring aresponse from the majority union. To combat
the minority unions, the majority union might well become more
militant in its administration and enforcement of the collective bar-
gaining agreement and more reluctant to refuse to process unmerito-
rious grievances for fear of losing members to a militant and perhaps
irresponsible rival union which would be inclined to arbitrate many
spurious grievances for purposes of campaign strategy. Without ex-
clusive union control over the grievance procedure, the employer
would be faced with two or more unions making often unreasonable
demands based on their intrepretations of the collective bargaining
24. Contra, Note, The Privilege of Exclusive Recognition and Minority Union Rights in
Public Employment, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 1004, 1016-23 (1970).
25. Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 362, 392 (1962).
26. In Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967), the Court did "not agree that the individual
employee has an absolute right to have his grievance taken to arbitration . . . ." See Black-
Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F.2d 179, 186 (2d Cir. 1962) (finding
that "[clhaos would result" if every grievance had to go to arbitration).
27. Douglas Aircraft Co., 25 War Lab. Rep. 57, 61-62 (1945), as cited in Cox, Rights Under
a Labor Agreement, 69 HARv. L. REv. 601, 626 (1956).
Imaginary grievances could be conjured up and others which, under ordinary cir-
cumstances, would be dropped at the first step could be magnified out of all propor-
tion to their importance. The settlement of grievances could become the source of
friction and competition and a means for creating and perpetuating employee dis-
satisfaction instead of a method of eliminating it.
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agreement in an effort to impress the employees and gain new mem-
bers for their organizations.
From the union's perspective, exclusive control of the grievance
procedure enhances the organization's prestige and authority, 2
builds loyalty among the members, and institutionalizes the union
in the eyes of the employees. Merely to maintain itself in power is
probably sufficient reason to explain the union's desire for exclusive
status. In addition, however, the grievance procedure often com-
pletes the contract or modifies the bargaining agreement to fit
changing circumstances or to address problems which are not read-
ily apparent during negotiations. Resolutions of individual griev-
ances often have ramifications that extend throughout the entire
bargaining unit. Therefore, since control over the grievance proce-
dure may well mean control over negotiating changing terms in the
contract and continuing the negotiating process, unions have a
vested interest in seeing that, just as they are the exclusive negotia-
tors of the contract, so too are they exclusive administrators of the
agreement.
B. The Duty of Fair Representation
There is a great potential for abuse in exclusive representation.
As the only party with the authority to compel the employer to
discuss grievances, 21 an unscrupulous union might exercise control
over the grievance procedure so as to emasculate the rights of dissi-
dent employees or employees who refused to support the union en-
thusiastically at critical times. Further, a union might refuse, for
invidious or irrelevant reasons, to process the grievances of members
of particular ethnic or religious groups.
Recognizing the grave implications of allowing a union to dis-
pense its statutorily granted powers in a discriminatory manner, the
Supreme Court held in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad:
So long as a labor union assumes to act as the statutory repre-
sentative of a craft, it cannot rightly refuse to perform the duty,
which is inseparable from the power of representation conferred
upon it, to represent the entire membership of the craft. [The
statute] . . . require[s] the union, in collective bargaining and in
making contracts with the [employer], to represent non-union or
minority union members of the craft without hostile discrimina-
tion, fairly, impartially, and in good faith.3
28. Summers, supra note 25, at 391.
29. Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962).
30. 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944).
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Though Steele was decided under the Railway Labor Act,3 1 the
duty of fair representation was soon applied to employees covered
by the National Labor Relations Act.3 2 The duty to represent fairly
all the employees in a bargaining unit stems directly from the
union's right to be the exclusive bargaining representative of all the
employees in the unit.33 Under the doctrine of the duty of fair repre-
sentation, the union's "exclusive . . .statutory authority to repre-
sent all members of a designated unit includes a statutory obliga-
tion to serve the interests of all members without hostility or dis-
crimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete
good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct. '3
In finding the duty of fair representation implicit in the particular
statutes,35 the Court avoided ruling on the difficult constitutional
questions which would arise had the Act conferred power without
any commensurate statutory duty.36
31. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1970).
32. See, e.g., Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976) (truckdrivers);
NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967) (UAW); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171
(1967) (meatpackers); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964) (auto transporters); Syres v.
Oil Workers Int'l Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1955) (oilworkers); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345
U.S. 330 (1953) (autoworkers).
33. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmeis Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180-81 (1967).
34. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967).
The exact extent of this duty has never been defined beyond saying that the union breaches
the duty when its conduct is "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith." Id. at 190. Legal
scholars debate what standard a union should be held to when it fails to take a member's
grievance to arbitration. See, e.g., Clark, The Duty of Fair Representation: A Theoretical
Structure, 51 TEX. L. REV. 1119, 1161-78 (1973); Tobias, A Plea for the Wrongfully Discharged
Employee Abandoned by His Union, 41 CIN. L. REv. 55 (1972); Comment, The National
Labor Relations Board and the Duty of Fair Representation: The Case of the Reluctant
Guardian, 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 437 (1977). The central theme in Vaca v. Sipes is that the
purpose of the duty is to "prevent arbitrary union conduct against individuals stripped of
traditional forms of redress by the provisions of federal labor law." 386 U.S. at 182.
The duty has been held to prevent unions from discriminating in contract negotiations or
in processing grievances on the basis of race, Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192
(1944); Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966); sex, NLRB
v. Local 106, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 520 F.2d 693 (6th Cir. 1975); or national origin,
NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 489 F.2d 635 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1040 (1974).
This duty extends to representing all members of the unit in the grievance procedure.
During contract negotiations, the cost differential between bargaining solely for union mem-
bers and bargaining for the entire unit is negligible. However, in contract administration,
each grievance and each arbitration have identifiable costs. The difference between process-
ing the grievances of members rather than the entire unit is great. Only in the processing of
grievances, up to and including arbitration, does the union have an economic reason to
discriminate against the nonmember.
35. In Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 199 (1944), the Court stated: "Congress
... did not intend to confer plenary power upon the union to sacrifice, for the benefit of its
members, rights of the minority of the craft, without imposing on it any duty to protect the
minority."
36. Id. at 198.
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In dicta, however, the Court stated in Steele:
We think that the Railway Labor Act imposes upon the statu-
tory representative of a craft at least as exacting a duty to protect
equally the interests of the members of the craft as the Constitu-
tion imposes upon a legislature to give equal protection to the
interests of those for whom it legislates.37
The Supreme Court has thus given constitutional dimension to the
duty of fair representation. Therefore, even if the courts are unwill-
ing to read into the statutes a duty to represent all the members of
the bargaining unit fairly, the duty will be found to arise from
constitutional considerations."
C. Union Security Agreements
As the exclusive bargaining representative for all employees in the
unit, the certified or recognized union is required to process the
grievances of all unit members, both union and nonunion, with the
same degree of enthusiasm. Organized labor, faced with nonmem-
bers receiving the same benefits as dues-paying members, sought to
remedy this inequity by bargaining with the employer to insert var-
ious provisions in the collective bargaining agreement to bolster the
union's treasury, strength, and membership. The most common of
these union security agreements were the closed shop, the union
shop, and the agency shop.
In a closed shop, the employer may hire or employ only workers
who are already members of the union. In a union shop, all employ-
ees are required to join the union within a specific period of time as
a condition of employment and to remain union members for the
duration of their employment with the particular employer who is
a party to the labor agreement. In an agency shop, the reluctant
37. Id. at 202. See also Syres v. Oil Workers Local 23, 350 U.S. 892, rev'g 223 F.2d 739
(5th Cir. 1955); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944); Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S.
248 (1944).
38. For decisions finding a duty of fair representation in the public sector, see Malone v.
United States Postal Serv., 88 L.R.R.M. 3010 (1974); McGrail v. Detroit Fed'n of Teachers,
82 L.R.R.M. 2623 (1973); New Jersey Turnpike Employees' Union v. New Jersey Turnpike
Auth., 303 A.2d 599 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973); Sedita v. Board of Educ., 371 N.Y.S.2d
812 (Sup. Ct. 1975); Antinore v. State, 371 N.Y.S.2d 213 (Sup. Ct. 1975); Kaufman v.
Goldberg, 315 N.Y.S.2d 35 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Belanger v. Matteson, 346 A.2d 124 (R.I. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 968 (1976).
For decisions finding a duty of fair representation in the private sector in right-to-work
states, see Sanderson v. Ford Motor Co., 483 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1973); Byrd v. Local 24, Int'l
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 375 F. Supp. 545 (D. Md. 1974); Davis v. Mason & Dixon Tank Lines,
Inc., 539 S.W.2d 40 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975).
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employee may refrain from joining the union, but, as a condition of
employment, he or she must pay the union a service fee which is the
equivalent of the initiation fees and dues paid by union members.
In 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act 39 "abolishe[d] the closed shop but
permit[ted] voluntary agreements for requiring such forms of com-
pulsory membership as the union shop or maintenance of member-
ship . *."..40 Outlawing the closed shop was a congressional response
to abuse by union leaders who dealt with dissidents and potential
rivals by suspending them from union membership, thus forcing
them to lose their jobs."
Recognizing, however, that "in the absence of such provisions
many employees sharing the benefits of what unions are able to
accomplish by collective bargaining will refuse to pay their share of
the cost,"'4 Congress permitted both the union shop and the agency
shop . 3 These forms of union security reflected congressional concern
that "at least as a matter of federal law, the parties to a collective-
bargaining agreement be allowed to provide that there be no em-
ployees who are getting the benefits of union representation without
paying for them.""
D. "Right-to- Work" Provisions
At the same time that Congress permitted union and agency
shops, Congress also enacted section 14(b) of the National Labor
39. Pub. L. No. 101, § 8(a)(3), 61 Stat. 140 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)
(1970)).
40. S. REp. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1947).
41. R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LA OR LAw 640 (1976).
42. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1947).
43. The Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 101, § 101, 61 Stat.
136, 140 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970)), provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization: Provided, That nothing in this Act, or in any other statute of the
United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor
organization ... to require as a condition of employment membership therein on
or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the effec-
tive date of such agreement, whichever is the later ... : Provided further, That no
employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for nonmembership
in a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that such
membership was not available to the employee on the same terms and conditions
generally applicable to other members, or (B) if he has reasonable grounds for
believing that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the
failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly
required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership ....
44. Oil Workers Int'l Union v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407, 416 (1976).
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Relations Act to prevent a total extinction of the state's power over
certain union security agreements. 5 Under section 14(b), states may
outlaw all forms of union security agreements within their jurisdic-
tions." Pressured by a national "right-to-work" movement, 7 twenty
states have enacted right-to-work laws banning such agreements.
48
However, states which proscribe union security agreements do not
have the authority to alter the principles of union exclusivity. Con-
sequently, the duty-of-fair-representation doctrine as enunciated in
Steele remains applicable in right-to-work states. Since the union
must act as the exclusive representative for all bargaining unit em-
ployees, it is not surprising that labor so vehemently opposes right-
to-work laws. In states where such statutes have been enacted, there
is nothing to prevent employees from going for a "free ride, '49 get-
ting the benefits of union representation, and forcing those who have
joined the union to pay higher dues and fees to compensate for the
"free riders' " failure to contribute.
Clearly, then, in states in which union security provisions are
permitted, the duty of fair representation will shield nonmembers
from union discrimination in the processing of grievances. In
"right-to-work" states, the duty of fair representation applies as
well. While it may appear unfair to require those employees who
have joined the union to pay the entire cost of contract administra-
tion, the benefits to all from exclusive representation and the need
45. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 101, § 101, 61 Stat. 136,
151 (1947) (amending National Labor Relations Act) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1970)).
46. See Oil Workers Int'l Union v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407 (1976).
47. In 1968, The National Right to Work Legal Defense Fund was created for the purpose
of "providing free legal aid to workers [so that] legal precedents could be established protect-
ing American workers against the injustices that arise from compulsory union membership."
The National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc., untitled folder (no date) (avail-
able from the organization at 8316 Arlington Blvd., Suite 600, Fairfax Va. 20038).
48. ALA. CODE tit. 25, § 27-7-30 to 36 (1975) (enacted 1957); Aaiz. CONST. art. XXV
(adopted 1946); ARK. CONST. amend. XXXIV (adopted 1944); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6 (adopted
1968); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-901 to 907, -9922 (1974) (enacted 1947); IOWA CODE §§ 736A.1-.8
(1977) (enacted 1947, amended 1959); KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 12 (adopted 1958); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 23:981-987 (West Supp. 1978) (enacted 1976); Miss. CONST. § 198-A (adopted
1960); NEB. CONST. art. XV, §§ 13-15 (adopted 1946); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 613.230-.300 (1973)
(enacted 1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-78 to 84 (1975) (enacted 1947); N.D. CENT. CODE §
34-01-14 (1972) (enacted 1947); S.C. CODE §§ 41-7-10 to 90 (1976) (enacted 1954); S.D. CONST.
art. VI, § 2 (adopted 1946); S.D. COMPmED LAWS ANN. §§ 60-8-3 to 8 (1967) (adopted 1947);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 50-208 to 210 (1977) (enacted 1947); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5154a,
§§ 8a, 11 (Vernon 1971) (enacted 1943); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-34-1 to 17 (1974) (enacted
1953); VA. CODE § 40.1-58 to 69 (1976) (enacted 1947); Wvo. STAT. §§ 27-245.1 to .8 (1967)
(enacted 1963).
49. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1947).
50. Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954); Miller v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 372
F. Supp. 170 (W.D. La. 1974); Anderson v. Ambac Indus., Inc., 356 N.E.2d 478 (N.Y. 1976).
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to protect individual rights5 justify the union's duty to process the
grievances of members and nonmembers with the same diligence
and care.
E. Public Employees
Congressional intervention in the field of labor-management rela-
tions represents a national commitment to collective bargaining as
the primary method of preventing industrial strife and promoting
the free flow of commerce.12 The National Labor Relations Act,
however, did not cover public employees. Section 2(2), in defining
employers subject to the Act, specifically excluded "the United
States, or any wholly-owned Government Corporation, or any Fed-
eral Reserve Bank, or any state or political division thereof. ... ."53
When the Act was passed in 1935, no respectable scholar or gov-
ernment official debated the state's authority to prohibit collective
bargaining by public employees.54 The prevailing philosophy of gov-
ernment sovereignty was that since the government is supreme, it
is immune from the pressures of collective bargaining.55 All deci-
sions pertaining to employer-employee relations were to be made
solely by government officials. Consequently, to permit unions to
participate in establishing the procedures and laws governing the
terms and conditions of employment for public workers would con-
stitute an illegal delegation of power.56
Since 1935, public service employment has become the most rap-
idly growing sector of employment in the United States, with nearly
one out of every five workers today on a government payroll. 7 Ac-
companying this increase in the public payroll has been a decline
in use of the sovereignty theory as a reason for denying public em-
ployees collective bargaining rights 8 and an increasing recognition
51. Absent a duty of fair representation, an individual would have no legal remedy against
the union and no mechanism to meet with the employer and vindicate his claim if the union
were permitted to refuse to process grievances.
52. See 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1970).
53. Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970)).
54. Proposition 13 and Public Employment, 98 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 314 (Aug. 14, 1978)
(report of proceedings at the 27th Annual Conference of the Association of Labor Mediation
Agencies); McCann & Smiley, The National Labor Relations Act and the Regulation of
Public Employee Collective Bargaining, 13 HAuv. J. LEGIS. 479, 485 (1976).
55. C. Rehmus, Labor Relations in the Public Sector (paper prepared for the 3rd World
Congress, International Industrial Relations Association, London, England (Sept. 3-7, 1973)),
reprinted in LABOR RELATIONS LAw IN THE PULuC SECTOR 5, 7 (R. Smith, H. Edwards, & R.
Clark eds. 1974) [hereinafter cited as C. Rehmus].
56. Id. at 7-8.
57. Id. at 5.
58. Id. at 8; see Zwerdling, The Liberation of Public Employees: Union Security in the
Public Sector, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 993, 997 (1976).
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that the values and goals which mandated granting such rights to
private employees are equally valid for public employees." The re-
sult has been a recognition by the federal" and state" governments
of the rights of their employees to bargain collectively through a
representative chosen by a majority of the employees. Given this
right, public workers have unionized in much higher percentages
than their private-sector counterparts2
Though neglected by Congress forty years ago, public-sector
collective bargaining has emerged as "one of the half dozen most
important issues the country faces."" Cases involving issues dealing
with public-sector labor law have come to "represent a growing and
increasingly important part of the [Supreme] Court's work." 4 In
the 1977 term, in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education," the Su-
preme Court gave "specific support to the concept of 'exclusive
[union] representation' "" and to the validity of the agency shop
in the public sector. Abood, for all practical purposes, places govern-
mental union security provisions on an equal footing with their
private-sector counterparts. Aside from the proscription of the right
to strike, 7 most public-sector labor enactments have been patterned
59. C. Rehmus, supra note 55, at 8.
60. In 1962, President John F. Kennedy signed into law Executive Order 10,986, granting
federal employees the right to bargain collectively. Employee-Management Cooperation in
the Federal Service, 3 C.F.R. 521 (1962).
61. At least 28 states have statutes recognizing public-sector collective bargaining and
other fundamental rights for state and local employees. The recognition varies as to the
categories of public employees covered and the rights guaranteed.
Eighteen states have comprehensive laws requiring collective bargaining for state and local
employees. Alaska's law covers state employees, allowing local employees to opt out. Four
states cover local employees. Two permit limited collective bargaining for state workers.
Three have "meet-and-confer" statutes covering both state and local workers. Zwerdling,
supra note 58, at 993-94 n.5.
62. About 58% of federal employees were represented by unions in 1976. 699 Gov'T EMPL.
REL. REP. (BNA) 4 (Mar. 14, 1977). About half of all state and local employees belonged to
employee organizations in 1975. 698 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 25 (Mar. 7, 1977). Union
membership for the total (public and private) workforce was 20% in 1976. 726 Gov'T EMPL.
REL. REP. (BNA) 24 (Sept. 19, 1977). The arrival of unionism in the public sector has
"provided enough new recruits to the labor movement to reverse the decline in the trade union
movement which took place during the late 1950's and early 1960's." C. Rehmus, supra note
55, at 83.
63. Address by John Dunlop, public-sector labor relations conference at Massachusetts
Bay Community College, Wellesley, Massachusetts (Mar. 14, 1977), reprinted in 700 GOV'T
EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 9 (Mar. 21, 1977).
64. Address by Benjamin Aaron, annual meeting of the Section of Labor Relations Law,
American Bar Association, Atlanta, Georgia (Aug. 9,1976), reprinted in 671 Gov'T EMPL. REL.
REP. (BNA) E-1 (Aug. 23, 1976).
65. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
66. Edwards, Labor Relations Law in the Public Sector, 724 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA)
25, 26 (Sept. 5, 1977).
67. Though granted rights are substantially equivalent to those of private employees, the
right to strike is withheld because of the essential nature of the services performed.
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after the National Labor Relations Act.' The Supreme Court has
held that, as in the private sector, unions representing public em-
ployees have the right to act as exclusive agents for the members
and also have the duty of fair representation: 69
The confusion and conflict that could arise if rival teachers' un-
ions, holding quite different views as to the proper class hours,
class sizes, holidays, tenure provisions, and grievance procedures,
each sought to obtain the employer's agreement, are no different
in kind from the evils that the exclusivity rule in the Railway
Labor Act [and in the National Labor Relations Act] was de-
signed to avoid. 0
In states permitting agency shops, Abood represents an
"important victory"" for all public employee unions. Public em-
ployees can now be charged for the services of their bargaining agent
(regardless of whether they requested such an agent), and the prob-
lem of free riders would seem to be eliminated."
However, in states with right-to-work laws, agency shops are ille-
gal in the public sector. 3 Federal employee unions, under section
12(c) of Executive Order 10,988 forbidding union security agree-
ments, are faced with "an overwhelmingly high rate of union organi-
zation with a correspondingly low rate of membership." 4 In the
twenty states with right-to-work laws, state and municipal em-
ployee unions may well face the same dilemma of high organization-
low membership. It is not inconceivable that the gains made in
organizing public employees will soon be dissipated by the burden
of supporting "free riders." If labor unions are seen as a means both
of ensuring industrial peace and of promoting industrial democracy,
it is in the interests of the public employer, the union, the individual
FLA. STAT. § 447.505 (1977) is typical: "No public employee or employee organization may
participate in a strike against a public employer by instigating or supporting, in any manner,
a strike."
68. Craver & LaPeer, The Legal Obligations of Governmental Employers and Labor Or-
ganizations Under the Recognition-Certification Provisions of the Florida Public Employees
Relations Act, 27 U. FLA. L. REv. 705, 711 (1975); see Edwards, The Emerging Duty to Bargain
in the Public Sector, 71 MICH. L. REv. 885, 932 (1973); McCann & Smiley, supra note 54, at
504.
69. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. at 221, 223.
70. Id. at 224.
71. Albert Shanker, president of the American Federation of Teachers, quoted in 710
Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 12 (May 30, 1977).
72. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. at 224.
73. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6, quoted in note 14 supra.
74. Sebris, Federal Free Riders and Employer Free Speech: Some Changes Needed, 6 J.
CouLLcrv NFGOIATIONS PUB. SECTOR 45, 46 (1977).
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workers, and the citizens dependent upon government service to
find a solution to this problem.
Ill. FLORIDA'S STATUTORY SCHEME: PROBLEMS WITH SECTION 447.401
Pursuant to the 1968 constitution, public employees in the State
of Florida were granted the right to bargain collectively through a
representative chosen by a majority of employees in a unit appropri-
ate for collective bargaining. Article I, section 6 of the Florida Con-
stitution provides:
The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on
account of membership or non-membership in any labor union or
labor organization. The right of employees, by and through a labor
organization, to bargain collectively shall not be denied or
abridged. Public employees shall not have the right to strike.
The Supreme Court of Florida interpreted this provision in 1969
as granting "public employees . . . the same rights of collective
bargaining as are granted [to] private employees"75 without, of
course, the right to strike. The legislature failed to act, however,
until 1974.76 Then, pushed by threats of judicial implementation,
the legislature enacted the Public Employees Relations Act
(PERA)," implementing article I, section 6 with respect to public
employees.
In many respects, PERA's provisions are analogous to those of the
NLRA. 71 The Florida Supreme Court has held that "[i]f a Florida
statute is patterned after a statute of a sister state, it is amendable
[sic] to the same construction that its prototype has been given
.... ,,79 National Labor Relations Board and Federal Court deci-
sions interpreting analogous legislation thus should be highly persu-
asive when applied to Florida's public sector ° PERA grants public
employees rights similar to those granted to private employees in
75. Dade County Classroom Teachers' Ass'n v. Ryan, 225 So. 2d'903, 905 (Fla. 1969).
76. See McGuire, Public Employee Collective Bargaining in Florida-Past, Present and
Future, 1 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 26, 28-59 (1973), for the events leading to passage of PERA, and
McHugh, supra note 9, for a consideration of the Act since passage. See also Dade County
Classroom Teachers' Ass'n v. Legislature, 269 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1972).
77. Act of May 30, 1974, ch. 74-100, 1974 Fla. Laws 134 (current version at FLA. STAT. § §
447.201-.609 (1977)).
78. Craver & LePeer, supra note 68, at 708.
79. State v. Aiuppa, 298 So. 2d 391, 394 (Fla. 1974); see Columbia County Bd. of Pub.
Instruction v. PERC, 353 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Pasco County School Bd.
v. PERC, 353 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977), both applying federal constructions
of the NLRA.
80. Craver & LaPeer, supra note 68, at 708.
FLORIDA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
section 7 of the NLRA.8 ' Provisions are made for union representa-
tion elections, 2 for exclusive union representation,1 and for a griev-
ance procedure which has as its final step binding arbitration. 4
Under PERA, individual employees are entitled either to bring
their grievances to the employer individually, subject to the union's
presence at the meeting, 5 or the employees can have their griev-
ances processed for them by the union."8 Public employees may also
elect to use either the civil service appeal procedure or the estab-
lished contractual grievance procedure to adjust their grievances. 7
In 1977, section 447.401 of PERA was amended to provide that
"[a]ll public employees shall have the right to a fair and equitable
grievance procedure, administered without regard to membership
. . . in any organization, except that certified employee organiza-
tions, shall not be required to process grievances for employees who
are not members of the organization." 8
This amendment is an innovative-and questionable-approach
to resolving the problems created when unions act as exclusive bar-
gaining representatives in states with right-to-work laws. Under
81. Compare FLA. STAT. § 447.301 (1977):
(1) Public employees shall have the right to form, join, and participate in, or
to refrain from forming, joining, or participating in, any employee organization of
their own choosing.
(2) Public employees shall have the right to be represented by any employee
organization of their own choosing and to negotiate collectively, through a certified
bargaining agent, with their public employer in the determination of the terms and
conditions of their employment .... Public employees shall have the right to be
represented in the determination of grievances on all terms and conditions of their
employment. Public employees shall have the right to refrain from exercising the
right to be represented.
(3) Public employees shall have the right to engage in concerted activities not
prohibited by law, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection. Public employees shall also have the right to refrain from engaging in
such activities.
with 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970):
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any
or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employ-
ment as authorized in section 158 (a) (3) ....
82. FLA. STAT. § 447.307(2)-(3)(a) (1977).
83. Id. § 447.307(3)(b).
84. Id. § 447.401.
85. Id. § 447.301(4).
86. Id. § 447.301(2), .401.
87. Id. § 447.401.
88. Act of June 24, 1977, ch. 77-343, § 14, 1977 Fla. Laws 1476 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
447.401 (1977)).
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Florida's statutory scheme, though unions bargain for all employ-
ees, they are not obligated to process the grievances of nonmember
employees in the bargaining unit. Nonmembers must either fend for
themselves or try to get assistance from the leaders of rival unions.
Though this approach will certainly eliminate the problem of "free
riders," its legal status is questionable. Furthermore, the ramifica-
tions of this amendment are likely to prove incompatible with the
goal of "promot[ing] harmonious and cooperative relationships
between government and its employees, . . . and . . . assuring...
the orderly and uninterrupted operations and functions of govern-
ment."89
The remainder of this article will discuss the ramifications of
section 447.401 of the Florida Statutes, point out its failings, and
suggest an alternative means to protect unions against the "free
rider" without harming the interests of labor, management, or the
individual employees.
A. The Duty of Fair Representation
The first question the Florida courts must address is whether
section 447.401, which relieves the union of any obligation to process
the grievances of nonmembers, violates the union's duty of fair rep-
resentation. In cases under the NLRA, failure to process the griev-
ances of both union and nonunion members equally is a breach of
the union's duty of fair representation. The same principle has
been held applicable to the public sector.9
One may argue that by granting public employees the right to
present their own grievances to the employer, PERA actually evis-
cerated the doctrine of exclusivity.2 Since the duty of fair represen-
tation stems from the union's exclusive control over contract nego-
tiation and administration, there is no need to require unions to
represent nonunion employees in processing grievances when indi-
vidual employees may submit their own grievances to the public
employer. This argument, though, does not withstand careful scru-
tiny.
Section 447.301(4) of the Florida Statutes grants public employ-
ees the right to present grievances individually or through legal
counsel, without the intervention of the bargaining agent. Section
447.501(f) makes it an unfair labor practice for a public employer
89. FLA. STAT. § 447.201 (1977).
90. See notes 29-38 and accompanying text supra.
91. See notes 68-70 supra.
92. See FLA. STAT. § 447.301(4) (1977).
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to refuse to discuss grievances in good faith with the certified bar-
gaining agent or the employee involved. A brief look at three rele-
vant labor law concepts indicates, however, that PERA does not
actually grant individual workers complete access to the grievance
procedure, and thus the duty of fair representation is necessary to
protect nonunion employees in Florida's public sector.
The NLRA contains a provision similar to section 447.301(4). Sec-
tion 9(a) of the NLRA grants the individual the "right" to present
his grievances to his employer. Section 9(a) provides that:
[Any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the
right at any time to present grievances to their employer and to
have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the
bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not incon-
sistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agree-
ment then in effect: Provided further, That the bargaining repre-
sentative has been given the opportunity to be present at such
adjustment.13
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted this lan-
guage as not conferring on the individual employee "an indefeasible
right ... to compel compliance with the grievance procedure up to
and including . . . arbitration . . . ." Rather, the court held that
section 9(a) " 'permit[s]' the employee to take his grievances to the
employer, and 'authoriz[es]' the employer to hear and adjust them
without running afoul of the 'exclusive bargaining representative'
language of... 9(a)."' 5
Under federal labor law, it is not an unfair labor practice for an
employer to refuse to entertain grievances from an individual em-
ployee.9" Just the opposite has been found to be true. Courts have
held that an employee who contravenes the established grievance
procedure negotiated by the union may be fired if the employee's
activities are so "opprobrious" that he forfeits the protection of the
NLRA.17 The justification for this interpretation of section 9(a) is
that the benefits to all concerned in having exclusive union control
over the grievance mechanism far outweigh any rights the individ-
ual employees may have to present their grievances.
93. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
94. Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F.2d 179, 185 (2d Cir.
1962).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 186; see Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S.
50 (1975).
97. See, e.g., Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 544 F.2d 320, 329 (7th Cir. 1976).
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However, even if the Florida courts determine that under sections
447.301(4)8 and 447.5011" an employer is required to meet with indi-
vidual employees to discuss their grievances, it is highly unlikely
that the courts will grant the employee the right to bring along a
nonunion outsider who is not an attorney to represent him.1° It is
important to note that the statute permits the employee to bring
only an attorney. The employee may not bring in members from
rival unions. Absent this ability to bring in outside representation, 0'
the "right to proceed alone, without union help, is meaningless."'
02
Frequently, employees will not know enough about their own con-
tractual rights or the procedures to be followed to vindicate their
claims. Without union help, the employees are rare who will have
the intelligence, ability, determination, and stamina to take their
own complaints through the established grievance procedure.
Rather, the aggrieved employees will advance through the second or
third stage of the procedure, and then, unable to obtain any trained
assistance, either will not follow the next step properly, or else will
be so intimidated by the public employer's labor relations and per-
sonnel managers that they will be forced to give up their claims
without getting the grievances adjusted satisfactorily.
The effect of section 447.401 thus is to cut off nonunion members
from any meaningful access to the grievance procedure. This is a
clear violation of the union's constitutional duty of fair representa-
tion, for nonunion members are treated unequally even though ex-
clusivity is maintained. While the legislature's intent in enacting
the amendment may have been laudable, it must be struck by the
courts because the effect violates individual rights.
Another area of concern is that in which the employer and the
union enter into a contract providing for members-only representa-
tion. At first glance, such an agreement would violate section
98. FLA. STAT. § 447.301(4) (1977) provides:
Nothing in this part shall be construed to prevent any public employee from
presenting, at any time, his own grievances, in person or by legal counsel, to his
public employer and having such grievances adjusted without the intervention of
the bargaining agent, if the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement then in effect and if the bargaining agent has been
given reasonable opportunity to be present at any meeting called for the resolution
of such grievances.
99. Id. § 447.501(1)(f) provides: "(1) Public employers or their agents or representatives
are prohibited from: ... (f) Refusing to discuss grievances in good faith pursuant to the terms
of the collective bargaining agreement with either the certified bargaining agent for the public
employee or the employee involved." (Emphasis added.)
100. Malone v. United States Postal Serv., 526 F.2d 1099 (6th Cir. 1975); Lexington-Blue
Grass Army Depot, 728 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 24 (Oct. 3, 1977).
101. See notes 17-28 and accompanying text supra.
102. Tobias, supra note 34, at 68.
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447.501, which prohibits the employer from discriminating in hiring,
firing, and tenure based on union membership. 03 However, the new
amendment to section 447.401, which does away to some extent with
union exclusivity by allowing the individual employee to bring the
grievance himself, appears to bring such a contract out of the ambit
of section 447.501.
Note that in the case recognizing the constitutional collective
bargaining rights of public employees in Florida, Dade County
Classroom Teachers' Association v. Ryan,'04 the Florida Supreme
Court required unions to represent members only, and the employer
was obligated to recognize the union as the bargaining agent only
for its members. The implementation of article I, section 6 of the
Florida Constitution by the legislature in 1974 greatly broadened
the scope of the union's power by providing for union exclusivity and
requiring the union to represent all employees in the bargaining
unit. The amendment to section 447.401 may inadvertently result
in a movement back to Ryan members-only bargaining. In a clash
between sections 447.501 and 447.401, the NLRA preference for ex-
clusivity'0 5 and its disfavor of members-only contracts" suggests
that exclusivity will be maintained and section 447.401 will be
struck down.
B. Employer Disciplinary Interviews
Another situation involving the question of union representation
arises when the employer calls an employee into his office for an
investigatory interview. The United States Supreme Court, in
NLRB v. J Weingarten, Inc., held that employees have the "right
[to have] union representation at investigatory interviews which
the employee reasonably believes may result in disciplinary action
against him."''0 From the union's point of view, attending the inter-
view is necessary not only for the sake of assisting the individual
employee, but also to see what, if any, bearing such a meeting might
have on the other employees in the unit.0
Since the Florida Public Employees Relations Commission and
the Florida courts have adopted a Weingarten analysis,'0 9 the follow-
ing questions arise:
103. See Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 37-38 (1954).
104. 225 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1969).
105. See note 17 supra for the text of § 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act.
106. See Gotham Air Conditioning Serv., Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. No. 182 (1978); Don Menden-
hall, Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 1109 (1972); Golden Turkey Mining Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 760 (1941).
107. 420 U.S. 251, 267 (1975).
108. Certified Grocers of Calif., 227 N.L.R.B. 1211, 1214 (1977).
109. Seitz v. Duval County School Bd., 346 So. 2d 644, 646 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
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(1) Is the union required to accompany nonunion members to
investigatory interviews when the nonunion employee requests the
union's assistance?
(2) Is a nonunion employee entitled to representation by an out-
side attorney or, more likely, by a rival union leader at the investiga-
tory interview (or the meeting to discuss grievances)?
(3) If (2) is answered affirmatively, is the employer, in addition
to meeting with the individual employee and his outside representa-
tive, required to invite the union representative to be present at the
investigatory interview?
(4) May union members, dissatisfied with their union's repre-
sentation, call in rival union leaders to represent them at the inves-
tigatory interview or during the handling of grievances?
Clearly, if questions (2), (3), and (4) are answered affirmatively,
many of the advantages gained by exclusive union representation
will soon be lost. If, in addition to calling in the individual em-
ployee, the employer must at the same time meet with the em-
ployee's representative and the union's representative, the time de-
lays caused by the inevitable scheduling problems would make the
employer reluctant to conduct such an interview. Thus, another
result of section 447.401 may be to curtail individual employees'
rights. The employer may prefer to take his chances and discipline
an employee without calling for an investigatory interview rather
than grapple with the delays, scheduling difficulties, and other
problems inherent in finding a mutually convenient time for all
concerned parties to meet and discuss the matter."'
The delay and other problems will be exacerbated in an industry
or occupation where there is intense rivalry between competing
employee organizations. For example, in Florida's public school sys-
tem, employees are split fairly evenly between representation by the
National Educational Association (NEA) and the American Federa-
tion of Teachers (AFT). If rival union representatives are allowed
to represent nonunion members at grievance adjustments and in-
vestigatory interviews, the strain on government employer-
employee relations and the tensions between the rival unions both
certainly will be greatly increased.
The presence of two employee organizations may interfere with
the legitimate interests of the public employer. Justice Brennan,
concurring in a Supreme Court opinion upholding the principle of
exclusivity in the public sector, has noted that "[tihere must be a
110. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 1276 (1977) (employer need not delay em-
ployee interview because particular union representative unavailable through no fault of
employer).
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limit to individual argument .. .if government is to go on.""' So
too must there be a limit on the right of individual employees to
bring nonunion members to represent them in grievances and inves-
tigatory interviews if industrial peace is to be maintained.
Failure to restrict the individual employee's ability to bring in
outside representation will have negative results for all parties con-
cerned. The employer will be faced with radical demands by rival
union leaders attempting to increase membership through a victory
in the grievance procedure."' The employer will be required to deal
with unmeritorious grievances being processed for their political
value rather than for any intrinsic merit. Much of the simplicity
gained by having uniform contract administration will soon be
lost."13
111. City of Madison v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 178
(1976) (citing Holmes, J., in Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441,
445 (1915)).
112. See Mack, Public Sector Collective Bargaining: Diffusion of Managerial Structure
and Fragmentation of Bargaining Units, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 281 (1974).
113. The authors' proposal in favor of exclusivity would avoid many of the problems that
would occur inevitably if individual employees were allowed access to the arbitration process.
For example, in a situation in which both the union and a nonunion employee are grieving
concerning the improper posting of job notices and the nonunion employee proceeds to arbi-
tration first, would the union be bound by res judicata by the arbitrator's finding of facts or
would the union have a chance to litigate the same facts?
Another issue which the legislature has not addressed is how the nonunion employee and
the employer would select an arbitrator in the absence of any previously agreed-upon proce-
dure and what would happen in the event of a disagreement.
Litigation has already raised the issues discussed here. An arbitration held on June 13,
1978, in Tallahassee, Florida, is illustrative. Three tenured teachers employed by the Leon
County School Board contended that they had been improperly dismissed by the school
board. The board claimed the teachers had resigned. The teachers filed a formal grievance,
but the school board refused to process it. The teachers then sought an arbitration proceeding
which the Leon Classroom Teachers Association (the union) challenged unsuccessfully in
circuit court.
The arbitrator, Russell A. Smith, held that he had no jurisdiction and remanded the case
to the parties. In his award, Mr. Smith stated that although the parties had attempted to
confer jurisdiction on him, he could not accept jurisdiction "in the face of the provision in
the Agreement giving the LCTA the exclusive right to carry grievances to the arbitration level
. .. Angel v. Leon County School Bd., No. 32-30-01-6-78, slip op. at 30 (Aug. 7, 1978)
(Smith, Arb.) (emphasis added).
Mr. Smith stated further:
[Girievants are really contending that, irrespective of what the existing collective
bargaining agreement provides concerning the arbitration process, a member of the
bargaining unit who is not a member of the duly certified organization, may, by
private agreement with the employer, establish an arbitral forum for the resolution
of a claim raised by a grievance alleging a violation of the collective bargaining
agreement provided, only, that the organization is notified and given a right to be
"present" at the arbitration proceeding. Such a device could be used by a minority
group of employees within the bargaining unit, or a minority union, as a method of
establishing a competive [sic] control of the administration and implementation
of the Agreement in themselves or the minority organization. Certainly this is not
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The certified or recognized union will now be required to press
overzealously for grievances it once would have disregarded as un-
meritorious for fear of losing members. The result will be more
difficult and often irrational bargaining, instability in bargaining
and contract administration, and consequent work stoppages. The
ultimate loser will be the public.
Moreover, union members will not really gain from this change
in that a reduction in dues and fees probably will be negligible
because of the union's increased activity in processing grievances it
normally would have settled or dismissed for lack of merit. The
increased instability and interunion rivalry will cause unions to
spend more on advertising and election campaigns, with the cost
being borne by union members.
The only individuals who might benefit by allowing rival unions
into the grievance procedure and into investigatory interviews
would be nonunion employees, who might conceivably get better
representation. Ironically, the amendment was enacted to protect
the unions against exploitation by these very employees. Absent the
amendment, the nonunion employee is still protected against ad-
verse union action by the duty of fair representation. This protec-
tion is supplied to the nonmember free of charge.
The costs to the union of handling the lower levels of grievance
procedure are not great enough to justify the union's failure to pro-
cess the grievances of nonmembers. Since the outcome of a griev-
ance will often have ramifications that extend throughout the entire
unit, it is in the public employer's, the union's, and the employee's
best interests to preserve exclusivity and require the union to pro-
cess the grievances of nonmembers.
IV. PROPOSAL
A. The Balance of Interests
An assessment of the competing interests involved in public labor
in a right-to-work state will help clarify the issues in finding a solu-
tion to the free rider problem.
The public employer has an interest in stable industrial relations,
in simplified contract administration which will exclude unmerito-
rious grievances, and in dealing with a responsible union.
contemplated in the normal collective bargaining relationship or by the typical
collective bargaining agreement, and I think it was not contemplated by the parties
to the Agreement here in question.
Id. at 31-32.
The attorney for the grievants has filed a charge with PERC in a continuation of this same
matter.
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The union, elected by a majority of the employees in the bargain-
ing unit, has an interest in maintaining proper relations with both
the public employer and with union members. The union must be
able to cull grievances which have no merit and must have the
resources to process meritorious grievances to arbitration if neces-
sary. At the same time, the union wishes to keep membership dues
as low as possible.
The union member has an interest in uniform contract adminis-
tration and in stable relations between the employer and the union.
He wants to know that his grievance will be handled with the ut-
most care by the union. And, like the union, he wants his dues to
be as low as possible.
The nonunion employee has an interest in seeing that his griev-
ance will be processed. Even though such an employee is not con-
tributing to the grievance mechanism, states with right-to-work
laws have mandated that the union must represent both union and
nonunion employees equally."' Thus, the nonunion employee wants
to see that his grievance proceeds "without hostility [and in] good
faith . . . ."I" He has no interest or right in determining who shall
represent him, nor does he have a right to bring in an outsider or
rival union leader to represent him.
Exclusivity must be preserved as the bedrock of stable labor rela-
tions and industrial peace. The problem of "free riders" in right-to-
work states remains if the solution requires majority unions to be
given exclusive control over the grievance procedure and at the same
time have the duty to represent fairly all employees in the unit.
B. Proposal
The major cost to unions in contract administration is in bringing
grievances to arbitration, the final stage of the procedure. Arbitra-
tion is an expensive process, and "[miany unions simply do not
have the financial resources to arbitrate every meritorious discharge
grievance.""' A proper solution to the "free rider" problem is to
require all nonunion employees to pay the costs of bringing their
grievances to arbitration. The grievance would proceed in the name
of the union, and the union representative, along with the individual
employee, would have the opportunity to argue the case before the
arbitrator. In this way, the employee would not be allowed to bring
114. See, e.g., Causey v. Ford Motor Co., 382 F. Supp. 1221 (M.D. Fla. 1974), aff'd &
rev'd, 516 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that labor organizations representing employees
in Florida have a duty to represent fairly all employees within the contract unit).
115. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967).
116. Tobias, supra note 34, at 59.
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in outside representation. The union would remain subject to its
duty of fair representation while the nonunion employee would be
guaranteed access to arbitration for his meritorious grievance so
long as he was willing to pay the costs.
Union exclusivity would be maintained since the only party for
the employer to deal with would be the union (or the individual
employee operating in the name of the union). The incumbent union
would continue to determine the merits of all grievances. The em-
ployee's rights would be limited to invoking the arbitration process
and either representing himself or having the union represent him.
The union would remain part of every arbitration proceeding, either
arguing the case on behalf of the employee or remaining present and
observing in order to protect the bargaining unit's interests. The
union thus would be relieved of the financial burden of representing
nonmembers for free. The key difference would be that unions
would be able to charge nonmembers for the union's services in
arbitration.
Union members should receive a reduction in their dues as the
number of arbitrations they are supporting is reduced. Much of the
resentment against fellow workers who were not contributing should
also be eliminated.
Nonunion members would be required to contribute to the costs
of their own arbitration hearings."7 While the costs of arbitration
may be so great that the employee may drop the suit should he
decide to proceed individually, his options nevertheless would re-
main open. He could join the union and of course quit if he were not
satisfied with the union's service. Or he could decide not to proceed
as far as arbitration. This arrangement does no injustice to the
state's right-to-work laws. Nonunion members would not be re-
quired to pay a service fee"8 or a fee under a fair share agreement," 9
which subjects them to immediate discharge on failure to pay.
No employee would have his right of employment "denied or
abridged on account of membership or non-membership in any...
117. One possible difficulty with this proposal arises when a nonunion employee takes his
grievance to arbitration individually and the grievance is one that will have an enormous
impact on the entire unit. In such situations, it would be blatantly unfair to charge the
individual employee the full cost of arbitration: the best procedure would be for the union to
pay the costs, or, more likely, have the arbitrator award costs to the individual employee, to
be paid by the union.
118. Schermerhorn v. Local 1625, Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 141 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1962)
(holding that a requirement that nonmembers pay a service fee abridges the state's right-to-
work policy).
119. Florida Educ. Ass'n/United v. PERC, 346 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977)
(holding a proposed fair share agreement unconstitutional). The court found "no real differ-
ence between agency shop [service fee] and fair share." Id. at 553.
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labor organization.' 2 0 Nonunion employees would not be coerced
into joining the union, nor would they be required to pay to have
their grievances processed.' 2' The free ride would end only at the
final stage-arbitration. If the employee felt. strongly enough about
his case, he would have to be willing to pay the price of obtaining
justice. 122
V. CONCLUSION
In the 1977 amendments to the Public Employees Relations Act,
the Florida Legislature attempted to solve the problem of "free
riders" in the public sector by adding to the individual's right to
process his own grievances the right of the unions not to process the
grievances of nonmembers. The results of such a system depend on
whether the Florida courts interpret this amendment to allow the
nonunion employee to bring in outside assistance (usually rival
union leaders) to represent him. If the courts decide that outside
representation is permissible, the benefits of exclusive union repre-
sentation will be eliminated. If outside assistance is denied, as it
should be, the nonmember will be effectively cut off from the griev-
ance procedure. The union will then be in violation of its duty of
fair representation.
The proper solution to this dilemma is to allow the union to main-
tain exclusive control over the grievance procedure but to require
the nonunion employee to bear the costs of bringing his complaint
through the expensive process of arbitration. In this way, industrial
peace will be preserved, the rights of all employees will be main-
tained, and the problem of "free riders" will be resolved without
running afoul of either the state's right-to-work laws or the union's
duty of fair representation.
120. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6.
121. See Rose, The Duty of Fair Representation In Public Sector Collective Bargaining,
5 J.L. & EDUC. 77 (1976).
122. See Blair, Union Security Agreements in Public Employment, 60 CORNELL L. REV.
183 (1975); Cox, supra note 27, at 652; Eissinger, supra note 4; Rose, supra note 121; Sum-
mers, supra note 25, at 403; Tobias, Individual Employee Suits for Breach of the Labor
Agreement and the Union's Duty of Fair Representation, 5 U. TOL. L. REv. 514 (1974).
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